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The paper examines the performance of seven parastatal firms 
including Kenya Airways, Kenya Railways, Kenya Pipeline, Kenya Power & 
Light, Kenatco, Kenya Posts and Telecommunications and Kenya Ports 
Authority. It is shown that those firms which enjoyed natural monopolies 
performed well financially, which allowed them to expand rapidly and 
avoid major operational problems. Those firms which faced more competi-
tion were more vulnerable financially, which led in turn to operating 
problems. 
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I. Introduction
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This paper will examine the performance of parastatpls which, ,
V
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operate in transport or infrastructure. This sector is, of 
course, crucial to all other sectors of the economy. , High 
transport costs can make other sectors uneconomic. Without basic .,,,,
1
' 
infrastructure such as electricity and communications,
 (
, 
development of any other sector is likely to remajip stjupted. In 
addition to the large indirect effect of infrastructure pn the 
macro-economy, it has been estimated that the transport sector 
absorbs foreign exchange worth 40'/. of Kenya's exports each year.' 
Obviously efficient operation has an important direct impact on 
the country's macro-economic condition. 
The sector has performed well in Kenya. In fact, .. 
superiority in this sector played a major, role in making Kenya. ,. , 
the location of choice for the headquarters of so many 
organizations, be they multinational corporations, U.N. agencies 
or private voluntary organizations. 
\ A i: :••••. . • i. • I * • • . i. 
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The firms providing infrastructure services kept up with ... 
rapid economic growth during the first decade of independence. .. i
( 
The second decade of independence ha# seen slower growth, but no 
one has ever suggested that it was the transport or 
infrastructure! sectors v-hich limited growth in that, period.
s
 . i.,
lV
i 
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Public enterprises have been key actors in the 
infrastructure sectors. Electricity is provided entirely by the 
government-owned Kenya Power and Lighting Co. ; communications are 
the monopoly of the Kenya Posts and Telecommunications. In 
transport there is somewhat more competition. The Kenya Pipeline 
Company monopolizes transport of white oil products from Mombasa-
Nairobi. But the national trucking and taxi company, Kenatco, 
competes in a fiercely competitive market where entry and exit 
are largely free and prices unregulated.
3
 Those transport firms 
in turn provide competition for Kenya Railways, though it is the 
only railroad in the country. Air transport to and from Kenya is 
provided by many different airlines, including the government-
owned Kenya Airways. 
This paper will begin, in section II, by analyzing the 
t 1 
performance since independence of each of the seven parastatais 
in the sector. For each firm we will examine efficiency, 
profitability, and pricing issues. After we examine the data by 
firm in section II, we turn in section III to a broader analysis. 
We examine general issues of pricing policy as they relate to the 
need for funds for expansion, and the impact of different pricing 
policies on efficiency. 
i
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II. Performance of individual companies 
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A. Kenya Pipeline Company 
The Kenya Pipeline Company (KPC) began transporting bulk oil 
products in 1978. By 1980 it was operating near full capacity 
and continues to do so. It has experienced good performance on 
all available measures. 
The cost performance of KPC is shown in Figure 1. As 
throughput increased from 1978 to 1980 real unit costs fell to 
half their original level and have remained essentially constant 
ever since. In other words, the factors which KPC controls, such 
as staff and materials for operating, maintenance and 
administration, have been kept strictly under control. The World 
Bank's assessment is that "the pipeline facilities are well 
maintained and Kenya Pipeline Company is an efficiently run 
operation, "* and that the pipeline "has helped lower transport 
system costs for petroleum in the Mombasa-Nairobi transport 
corridor. However the devaluations of the early eighties have 
caused financial costs to drift upwards. As the KPC pays off its 
debts, interest payments will become a smaller part of total 
costs. 
Figure 1 also shows the average price the KPC receives for 
transporting bulk oil products. This price is fixed by the price 
controller. Figure 1 reveals evidence of a regulatory lag in 
price adjustments. The average price at initiation of business 
! • •VJ 
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in 1978 vas inadequate to cover total costs including interest, 
and it vas only in 1980 that price caught up vith 1978 cost 
levels. Since costs were actually falling sharply during this 
period, no serious financial problems resulted. Since 1980 real 
prices have drifted downward toward costs. If devaluation 
continues to impose higher costs on the KPC, and if the 
regulatory lag continues, it could result in financial problems, 
but certainly had not done so by 1983. 
KPC has been highly profitable, as shown in Figure 2. 
Following a loss during the initial part year of operation, the 
KPC has earned very high rates of return. Total returns on net 
assets (R01 in Figure 2--defined as profit plus interest over net 
assets) have generally surpassed 25'/., while returns on equity 
have generally been double that. Thus the KPC is quite able to 
meet its debt obligations and also has since 1980 made large 
contributions to the Treasury in the form of corporation tax and 
dividends as well. These contributions have averaged about 15'/. 
of the net assets of the Pipeline. 
Finally, two aspects of the financial health of the KPC are 
shown in Figure 3. The KPC has largely been financed by debt. 
The ratio of equity to net assets has gradually increased from 
around .1 in 1978 to .4 in 1982, as retained earnings have 
mounted. Thus the generous pricing policies have permitted 
successful use of the risky strategy of high leverage. The 
-o - I JS /u? 451 
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current ratio has generally exceeded one, a healthy level. The 
policy of paying high dividends (in 1383 dividends exceeded 
profits) has kept the KPC from developing excess liquidity. 
In summary, the Kenya Pipeline Corporation seems to have 
been managed well, with stable real unit costs since full 
capacity utilization was achieved. The government chose to 
finance the KPC through a high risk strategy of depending almost 
entirely on borrowed funds, but has followed through with a price 
policy which has permitted this strategy to work well. In fact 
this price policy is subject to criticism for working too w e l l -
it is clear that prices have been monopolisticaily high. These 
high prices have been used to generate very high profit levels, 
far higher than needed to cover debt service. In other words, 
the price structure has served as part of the system of taxes on 
consumption of petroleum products. There is no particular reason 
why such a tax should be levied via the transport system rather 
than directly. On the other hand, given the natural monopoly of 
the KPC on transporting oil products there is no particular 
distortion introduced by doing so. 
B. Kenya Posts and Telecommunications 
Kenya Posts and Telecommunications was started in 1978 
following the breakup of East African Posts & Telecommunications. 
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Like its predecessor, the KP&T is enjoined under its enabling 
statute to "conduct its business according to commercial 
principles" and to ensure that, "taking one year with another" 
its revenues are sufficient to cover all its expenses, including 
the opportunity cost of capital. The KP&T, like the EAP&T before 
it, has always succeeded in that task. 
The KP&T is a multi-product firm, with no appropriate single 
measure of output. Figure 4 shows indices of three measures of 
its output. Its fastest growing market, both before and after 
the breakup of EAP&T, has been phone service. The number of 
private lines installed grew at 7.3'/. p. a. from 1964 to 1973, and 
at 8'/, from 1975 to 1984, an impressive achievement in compound 
annual growth rates. Demand for phone service has grown even 
faster, resulting in growing waiting lists and complaints about 
delays. . 
Demand for letter delivery has also grown fast, though not 
as fast as for phone service. It grew 55i p. a. from 1966 to 1974 
and 7.7'/. p. a. from 1975 to 1984. In contrast, the demand for 
parcel delivery declined during the earlier period and then 
stagnated during the later period. 
Unfortunately, the fact that there is no good index of 
output precludes calculation of either unit costs or revenues, so 
it is impossible to say with what degree of efficiency KP&T has 
•if..';.!' 
- 1 0 - IDS/toP 451 
IDS/WP 451 
carried out its impressive expansion of services. It is also not 
possible to measure average consumer prices. KP&T annual reports 
mention several times that price adjustments were allowed only 
infrequently and after long delays. 
According to the allocation of costs reported by KP8.T 
between postal services on the one hand and telecommunications on 
the other, the latter service has been subsidizing the former 
almost continuously since 1973. No doubt this cross-subsidy was 
attractive on grounds of income distribution. It probably also 
reflects growing competition in the parcel delivery business. 
The data shown in Figure 5 suggest that the delays in price 
adjustment were not so serious as to prevent the corporation from 
meeting its commercial objectives. The rate of return on net 
assets has fluctuated between 5 and 12'/., while the return on 
equity has been consistently higher, fluctuating between 10 and 
20'/.. Thus the corporation has charged prices adequate not only 
to meet its interest obligations, but also to permit some self-
financing of expansion. KP8.T does not pay corporation taxes or 
dividends; all operating surpluses are retained for reinvestment. 
Figure 6 shows that the financial condition of the KP8.T (and 
the EAPS.T before it) has been very stable. Slightly over half of 
investment has been financed by borrowing, and there has been no 
tendency for the equity base to decline. The Corporation has 
- 1 2 - IDS/WP 451 
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enjoyed healthy liquidity throughout the period since 
independence. 
C. Kenya Power and Lighting Corporation 
The Kenya Power and Lighting Corporation supplies and 
distributes electricity throughout the country. Prior to 1983 it 
was known as East African Power and Lighting, though it was never 
part of the East African Community Common Services Organization. 
EAPL was a private company registered on the London stock 
exchange until the government bought a majority of shares in 
1970. Its current status as to ownership of shares is not known 
to the author. It seems that an undetermined number of shares 
are owned by the National Social Security Fund, in addition to 
some third of shares owned directly by government. KPL, in 
addition to generating some power also purchases electricity in 
bulk from its subsidiary, the Kenya Power Co., and from the Tana 
River Development Corporation. 
The demand for electricity has grown very rapidly. Sales 
(measured in GWHrs) have grown at a rate of 7.4X p. a. from 1964-
84. This impressive output expansion has been accompanied by 
impressive performance on most other measures as well. 
Figure 7 shows the record on behavior of real unit costs. 
••• - " - ^ 1 5 - IJS/WP 451 
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Costs have been stable throughout the post-independence period. 
Unit costs increased in 75/76 due to drought conditions. Much of 
Kenya's base generating capacity is hydroelectric, while it has 
standby thermal capacity. During droughts these thermal plants 
are operated more, at higher unit cost. The jump in costs in 
1981 was reportedly due to devaluation of the shilling. 
Figure 7 also shows the trends in real consumer prices for 
electricity. The real average price level declined by some 255C 
cj. 
from the late sixties to the mid seventies and has remained 
essentially stable since then. 
Figure 8 shows that the rates have been adequate for KPL to 
i " ". 
earn healthy returns on equity. These returns fluctuated between 
eight and sixteen percent from independence to 1980. After 
dipping lower in 1981 they have generally exceeded 20*/. during the 
eighties. Interest payments by KPL are not available, so it is 
not possible to compare returns on equity with returns on 
investment. 
The financing of KPL has been fairly conservative, with low 
levels of borrowing. This is shown in Figure 9. The share of 
investment financed by equity never fell below 70'/. during the 
period 1963-80. Since 1981 KPL has borrowed much more heavily, 
with the share of net assets financed through borrowing rising to 
60'/.. The high rates of return on equity shown in Figure 8 during 
1ZI-
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this period of heavy borrowing show that prices have remained 
more than adequate to permit KPL to meet its growing debt 
obligation. Figure 9 also shows that liquidity seems to have 
been adequate throughout the period. 
Little information is available on how decisions are made 
about which areas should get priority in construction of new 
facilities. Hovever, it appears from the notes in the annual 
1
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reports that since 1978 KPL has operated a rural electrification 
scheme using funds provided by government and earmarked for this 
purpose. This scheme has accumulated losses, with resulting 
. - SIJ'.I TJTI
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liquidity problems. Construction under the scheme was reported , . . i i i , ,-,.• .. , i lO .
1
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to have been suspended in 1984 due to these financial problems of 
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the scheme. Though sales under the scheme grew at a 38% annual 
rate from 1979 to 1984, by 1984 they constituted less than 1% of 
sales, it appears,' then, that KPL has not been used very 
extensively as an agent of district focus, certainly not on the 
scale of Kenya Commercial Bank,' for example. 
D. Kenya Ports Authority 
. .
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The ports iri Kenya have gone through several organizational 
:
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incarnations. At independence they were under the East African 
Railways and Harbours. From 19S9 they were handled by the East ... i . ,.,<•.( . • v :•••; ' -• 5 ! it. ii African Harbours Corporation. Fallowing the breakup of the East 
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African Community, they have fallen under the Kenya Ports 
Authority, established in 1978, 
During the first decade of independence, cargo handled at 
the port of Mombasa grew steadily, at a compound annual rate of 
5.1*/.. Since 1974 tonnage has been untrended, though some large 
swings have occurred. Since 1978 containerized cargo has grown v 
very fast, averaging 51% per, year. Throughput at Mombasa is
f
.
: 
shown in Figure 10. . , 
Available information on real unit costs and revenues is.,
:
 . , 
shown in Figure 11. Unit costs were untrended during the days of 
EAR&H. During the operations of the KPA they were more volatile, 
but also appear to be untrended. They seem to have been higher 
by some 30% during the latter period than the former, but it is 
possible that some difference in basis of reporting could account 
for at least part of the difference. 
The same conclusions apply to the behavior of real average 
revenue/ton. During the early period it was untrended. During 
the later period it was still untrended, but much more volatile. 
It appears that real average revenue/ton was higher by some 30'/. 
during the epoch of the KPA than during that of EARS.H, but the 
same caution applies to this interpretation. 
That the level of prices has been adequate is demonstrated 
-lil- iJS/-ti> 451 
-22-
XJ8/wP 4ol 
, ;
 " -25- IDS/WP 451 
in Figure 12. Rates of return averaged around 15% during 1977-
80, and have averaged around 8% frq» 1981-83. The Ports have 
been able to finance about 85% of net assets without resort to 
borrowing, as shown in Figure 13, It can also be seen there that 
the KPA has enjoyed very high liquidity levels, especially around 
the time of the coffee boom. Financial information on the 
performance of the port is not separable from that of the 
railways for the years 1964-68. 
E. Kenya Airways 
Kenya Airways was created in 1977 as the local successor to 
East African Airways. It drew most of its staff from EAA, but no 
airplanes. When aircraft were purchased they were different 
types than those used by EAA, necessitating large-scale staff 
retraining. The accounting system initially used was also 
different from that of EAA. The first annual report stated that 
low staff education levels made re-training range from time 
consuming to inpossible. The auditor's report on the accounts 
was highly qualified, and remained so for several years. It is 
clear that there was virtually no management information system 
during the early years and serious mismanagement cannot be ruled 
out. 
From the beginning Kenya Airways had serious problems, Bnd 
- 2 4 -
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these show up in the figures presented below as lackluster 
performance from 1978-1980. However, in 1981 a team from the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) was invited to 
study KA and make recommendations for its improvement. This team 
of industry experts made two recommendations: first KA needed a 
modern fleet and second that management should be reorganized. 
The second recommendation was acted on immediately, and we will 
show that this brought some positive results. The first and more 
basic recommendation was never implemented during the period of 
this study.
7 
Kenya Airways' financial performance has always been very 
poor. Figure 14 shows that the rate of losses on total assets 
has averaged 25% from 1978 to 1983. The rate of loss has 
decreased steadily since 1980 when it peaked at 34.47. of total 
assets. By 1983 losses had been reduced to 20% of total assets. 
The press reported in late 1984 that KA broke even in 1983/84 and 
would report a small surplus in 1984/85.' The accounts for those 
years were not available to the author at the time of writing. 
An increasing portion of these losses has gone into interest 
payments as KA has resorted to heavy borrowing to stay in 
business. 
Figure 15 shows KA's deteriorating financial condition. The 
airline was started with equity of less than 10% of total assets. 
Repeated losses and resort to borrowing mean that the ratio of 
-27- IJS/UP 451 
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equity to total assets has continuously declined. By 1983 
accumulated losses exceeded total assets by over 40%. Working 
capital was never sufficient and has declined steadily. By 1983 
current assets were less than half current liabilities. 
In addition to improving its financial performance steadily 
since 1980, Kenya Airways experienced a turnaround in several 
other measures of performance around the same time. Figure 16 
shows real costs/passenger-kilometer. This cost index rose at a 
rate of 6'/. p. a. during 1978-81 but has not risen since then. 
This index of costs is biased against KA, since it is based only 
on KA's main output, passenger service. In addition to serving 
passengers KA handles cargo. Figure 17 shows that from 1981 to 
1983 cargo grew faster than passenger services., so that if it 
were possible to allocste costs between passengers and cargo, 
real unit costs in passenger service probably declined a little 
from 1981 to 1983. 
Figure 18 suggests that KA has made some good progress in 
rationalizing operations. From 1978 to 1981 the load factor for 
passengers increased steadily, from 45% to 61%, a level 
considered good by international standards. It has stayed 
approximately constant since then. Since 1981 the load factor 
for cargo has increased steadily, from 48% to 62%. 
In Fiqure 19 we compare total passengers carried by Kenya 
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Airways with total passengers using Nairobi airport. The two 
magnitudes grew in close synchronization from 1978-82, suggesting 
that Kenya Airways probably approximately retained whatever 
market share it had at inception. Since 1982 passengers carried 
by KA has grown much faster than total passengers using Nairobi 
airport, suggesting that KA may be gaining market share. Part or 
all of this gain in market share may be due to enforcing KA's 
monopoly on travel of civil servants on official business. Since 
Figure 19 contains no information about length of trip, it is 
possible that it exaggerates KA's relative growth. For example, 
it could be that it reflects fast growth in the domestic market 
only, where KA has little competition. 
Figure 19 also compares freight carried by KA with all 
freight handled at Nairobi airport (both measured in tons). KA 
has had much faster growth of freight traffic than has the 
industry as a whole. Furthermore, it is less likely that the 
growth has been on domestic freight, so it probably indicates 
increased competitiveness on the part Df Kenya Airvays. 
By 1984, it was the judgement of the trade press that KA's 
management had performed well, but that further progress was 
impeded by obsolete equipment. 
The fact that the bulk of the tourists visiting Kenya's game 
parks and beach resorts travel on foreign airlines to reach 
Nairobi cannot be blamed on the Kenya Airways' management, 
which has done its utmost to promote the national carrier 
, ;
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abroad and to provide a high standard of in-flight service. 
But however good the promotion and cabin service few 
passengers voluntarily select Kenya Airways for long-
distance flights to or from Nairobi when able to fly on a 
carrier operating widebody equipment.* 
The main reason for delay in purchase of new aircraft was 
national financial stringency. Virtually since KA's creation the 
country has been short of foreign exchange, operating under a 
series of INF stabilization programs which have limited such 
major investments.
1 0
 By 1986 the investment could no longer be 
postponed, since European noise regulations banned KA's old 707s 
from landina. At that time KA acquired two new Airbuses. The 
predictions oi the trade press that new aircraft could make KA a 
viable competitor with the major European airlines which serve 
Nairobi will now be put to the test. m 
In summary, it seems that Kenya A:\rwaye was started under 
very difficult conditions, with no equipment and virtually no 
financial base. Their financial performance has been bad, and 
its position has been made worse by the policy of financing it 
almost exclusively via loans. On the other hand, the corporation 
has performed credibly in terms of rationalizing its operations 
and competing for business with other airlines, showing steady 
improvement on most measures, both financial and operational, 
since 1980 or 1981. „ , .. . 
V -
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F. Kenya National Transport Corporation 
The Kenya National Transport Corporation (Kenatco) appears, to 
have come into the public sector in a rescue operation around 
1966, or perhaps somewhat earlier. Prior to its rescue by the 
public sector Kenatco was a "large and confused co-operative 
transport company founded in 1964, in which some prominent people 
had a stake.
 1 , 1 1
 It appears that many things have remained 
confused at Kenatco ever since, 
i 
Kenatco has two lines of business, goods transport via 
lorries, and taxis. During the mid sixties it also operated a 
fleet of inter-city passengpr buses, but government decided to 
reserve that sector for independent African operators.
12
 Though 
no figures are presented, the notes in the annual reports suggest 
that the major share of Kenstco's transport business was 
international trade. As conditions became more difficult during 
the seventies with security in Uganda deteriorating, foreign 
exchange shortages in Zambia, and finally the closure of the 
border with Tanzania, this business became less viable. There 
was a respite from these woes during the coffee boom. During 
1980 coffee generated 80'/. of turnover. 
Taxi operations were increased following the IMF meetings in 
Nairobi, when Kenatco was bequeathed the large fleet of Mercedes 
acquired for transporting the many VIPs who attended that 
IDS/WP 451 
meeting. Kenatco has since then maintained a taxi fleet 
consisting only of Mercedes, a policy made possible by waiver of 
import duties. 
Several times there have been major upheavals in the company 
with most of the management being replaced. This happened in 
1970, 1977 and 1980 or 1981, to-the author's knowledge. In 1977 
the new general manager made the following comments to the Board 
of Directors: 
The organization prevailing in the operation department at 
the time I came in was bad. Nobody knew who was doing what 
job, what vehicles were available and what work was in 
progress. No proper records were maintained and essential 
information for its running could only be obtained .from the 
accounts department. The importance of loading documents 
was not appreciated in which case there was no control. In 
fact at the time, there were well over 400 DBO's which 
although issued to the various drivers had not been 
accounted for. They even did not know -which driver was 
driving what truck and which driver was idle or off. In the 
circumstance no meaningful management reports. .. could be 
availed to management.
1 1 
He also reported that the company's stores were virtually 
uncontrolled. Creditors were not pursued for payment, nor were 
debtors paid. The secretarial department was neglecting its 
duties completely, including licensing of lorries, investigation 
. • .: jf". . . . . . • • 
of stolen property and debt collection. He furthermore 
complained that the "workshops are staffed with mechanics who are 
not trained at all and a lot of them were employed just because 
., , • •• . .•;. V I, i-,r.... , •. . . • ' > i" • r -
they knew somebody soafi'where. 
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The management situation does not seem to have improved, or 
anyway did not remain better for long. In 1983 Treasury staff 
noted that 
Kenatco's management lack the most important management 
tools for commercial enterprises, i.e. budgetary systems and 
perhaps costing systems...The Kenatco business is being done 
blindly...
1 5 
Figure 20 shows Kenatco's financial performance, which has 
been volatile, to say the least. Unfortunately, the accounts are 
not detailed enough to reveal the causes of the various wild 
swings in performance. Figure 21 reveals that since the mid 
seventies the company has been illiquid. The equity base began 
eroding in 1980, but had not disappeared entirely by 1982. The 
company was put under receivership in December, 1983. It is 
likely that if accounts were available after 1982 they would 
reveal continued poor performance. 
Kenatco has never published any data reporting any physical 
measure of output. Turnover is shown in Figure 22. Since no 
information is available on either prices or output it is unclear 
how to interpret the upward trend in revenue. 
Kenatco
7
s precarious financial condition in the years 
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immediately prior to its being placed under receivership was 
greatly weakened by a poorly implemented policy on security 
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escorts for transit cargo in the Northern Corridor Transport 
System.
1
 * In 1981 Kenya agreed vith Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Zaire and the EEC that greater security was needed and each 
member state was to provide security escort services for transit 
goods. Normally such duty would fall to the police. The 
decision was taken fairly abruptly, so that there was little time 
for planning. Since Kenatco was in possession of suitable escort 
vans it provided the transport and travelling allowances for the 
police officers who were to escort transit goods. 
The decision to provide escort services was taken in August, 
1981, and the escort services began in September of the same 
year. Mo provisions were made for compensating Kenatco for 
providing for these police functions, which they seem to have 
provided not only for their own traffic, but also for other 
transporters. Invoices submitted to the Office of the President 
were returned "with the remarks that no funds were allocated for 
that purpose. " This condition is understandable for the 1981/82 
fiscal year, the budget for which had already been approved when 
the matter arose. However, the 1982/83 budget and the 1983/84 
budget also failed to make provisions. 
By 31 May, 1983 the amount outstanding to Kenatco for escort 
services was Shs 12.4 million, an amount equal to nearly one 
third of Kenatco's net assets. At that time Kenatco was living 
on an overdraft on which it paid 1SX interest. There can be no 
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doubt that Kenatco's decline was hastened by this policy, for 
which it can hardly be held responsible. 
Current policies encourage and enforce parastatals to engage 
in forward planning and budgeting, a laudable goal. However, it 
must be recognized that when firms' attempts to plan are swamped 
by major upheavals in their environment, upheavals often caused 
by central government itself, the results will be minimal. Firms 
operating in competitive environments are especially unable to 
bear such sudden extra demands when no provision is made for 
their finance. 
G. Kenya Railways 
The Kenya Railways Corporation began operations in 1978 
following the breakup of the East African Community. Prior to 
that it had two other incarnations after independence, as the 
East African Railways and Harbours <1963-68) and as the East 
African Railways (1969-73). We will consider the railway 
throughout the period without distinguishing its various < 
incarnations. Except where noted, data presented for the 1963-
68 period apply only to the Railways' operations, not to the 
Harbours. 
During the sixties and early seventies freight traffic was 
, ;
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growing fast, as shown in Figure 23. Since the late seventies, 
however, KR's traffic has stagnated as competition from other 
modes of transport has increased. Figure 24 shows that in value 
terms road transport has increased much faster than rail since 
1975. The pipeline has also diverted traffic frOm rail since it 
began operating in 1978. 
This shift of traffic away from the Railway was largely due 
to the breakup of East African Railways.
1 7
 Figure 25 shows that 
"V
 %
 j': '.1
 1 
through the mid-seventies transit traffic was an important part 
of total traffic. However, following the breakup of EAR, 
conditions for transit traffic were unfavorable to rail. Uganda 
Railways was ill-equipped to start with and continued to 
deteriorate, so that by 1980 they were depending on five branch -I -< 'p 
line locomotives for motive power. Furthermore, conflicting 
• - i- . i 
claims between KR and UR made cooperation virtually impossible. 
• I « i • . .' i i • 
At the same time that lack of cooperation between the 
railroads made transit by rail very difficult, large excess 
capacity existed in road transport.
1 4
 Transporters who had plied 
the southern routes found their business there cut off by 
Zambia's foreign exchange problems and the eventual closure of 
the border with Tanzania. The completion of the Kenya Pipeline 
also released a large fleet of road tankers which began to 
compete with the Railways to transport oil products in transit to 
Uganda. 
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In light of these difficult market circumstances Kenya 
Railways allowed much of the transit traffic to switch from rail 
to road. Instead it concentrated on serving long haul domestic 
traffic, in which it was actually able to increase its market 
share.'* 
The discouraging market conditions of the seventies 
manifested in KR's operating ratios. Figure 26 shows an index of 
labor productivity. This index rose steadily from independence 
until the breakup of the community. From 1973 to 1978 
(JA u J u u t - j . V x Lf U d b l l u e a . T I . J . O J e a n n e n a s d u e a i e u u y J . 3 / 0 w n e i l 
the upward trend in productivity resumed. However, from 1980 to 
1983 an alarming downward trend in productivity began. 
All of these changes in productivity have been mirrored in 
cost performance, as shown in Figure 27. Real unit costs 
declined steadily in the period before the breakup of EAR. They 
iumped during the breakup and then seemed to be coming back under 
control again from 1978 to 1980. 
In view of the increasing productivity and falling costs, 
real average prices vere allowed to fall in the early period. 
They fell by over SOX from 1965 to 1973. Part of the pressure to 
lower real rail rates came from increasing competition from road 
transport. The completion of the paving of the Mombasa-Nairobi 
-49- IJS/WP 451 
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road in 1967 made such competition feasible for the first time.
 ! 
The completion of the pipeline from Dar es Salaam to Ndola in 
1968 meant there was excess capacity in road tankers.
4 0
 The 
railroad was especially vulnerable to this new competition 
because of its pre-competition rate structure which included 
various elements of value of service pricing (where higher 
tariffs are charged for more valuable goods, so the railroad can 
extract higher profits from shippers). Rail tariffs for the 
highest value commodities were gradually squeezed and the rate 
structure compressed. In 1973 the average revenue per tonne-
kilometer for the highest value commodity exceeded that of the 
lowest value commodity by a ratio of about three to one. This 
ratio fell continuously, reaching two by 1981. By 1983 the World 
Bank judged that the "tariff structure produces an acceptable 
correlation between costs and revenues for a wide variety of 
traffic."
a
' 
Despite efforts on the part of KR to bring tariffs into line 
with costs, there are two factors which inhibit them from fair 
market based competition with road transporters. The first 
problem is the existence of Bpecial tariffs outside the tariff 
structure, tariffs dictated by Government with the goal of 
subsidizing certain commodities, primarily exports. The 
subsidized commodities include fluorspar, molasses, sisal, soda 
i 
ash and maize and wheat. . In 1983 these commodities accounted for 
35X of tonnes carried by KR. Naturally the existence of such a 
, ;
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large portion of subsidized traffic means that in order for KB to 
cover its costs it must charge higher rates on other commodities, 
commodities for which it competes directly with road 
transporters. 
The second problem which keeps KR from adjusting it's tariff 
schedule to make it truly competitive with road is that KR is 
expected to cover its total costs, including the cost of 
maintaining the railroad infrastructure. Road transporters, on 
the other'hand, do not bear the cost of maintaining the road 
infrastructure. World Bank consultants report that road-user 
charges in the form of fuel taxes, registration and licence fees 
and import duties on equipment and vehicles do not cover the 
marginal cost of road use, especially for heavy vehicles which 
compete directly with rail transport.
e i
 The result is that 
market signals are encouraging shippers to choose road over rail 
in situations which do not reflect true costs to the economy. 
There is little that KR can do to combat this problem, since both 
rail tariffs and road use charges are decided at cabinet level. 
Meanwhile the combination of policies is contributing to severe 
financial strains at KR. 
There is some evidence that flight of high value commodities 
to road transport has occurred. Figure 27 shows that the real 
average revenue per tonne-mile received by KR declined by over 
20X from 1978 to 1980. Figure 28 shows average real revenue per 
- 6 6 -
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tonne-mile for the major tariff categories. Out of the six 
tariff categories which accounted for 88/. of revenue in 1978, 
only one category showed a decline equal to the average decline. 
Over this period the portion of total commodities in the low 
value categories was growing as high value categories switched to 
road transport. The defection of high value traffic may have 
ended after 1980. The overall average rate of growth in real 
unit revenue and performance by category seem to correspond 
fairly closely from 1980 to 1983. 
The combination of factors described above contributed to 
poor financial performance by KR. KR faced increasing 
competition for high value commodities from 1967 onwards. The 
breakup of the EAR and EAC gave a huge advantage to road 
transporters in the transit segment of the market. Real average 
revenues continued to decline after the breakup of EAR and 
establishment of KR, but by that time revenues had declined to 
where they no longer covered total costs including 
infrastructural maintenance costs. 
As a result of the disruptions of the breakup of EAR and 
inadequate financial base, operations of KR suffered. This can 
be seen in Figure 27 where unit costs jumped at the time of the 
reorganization. These factors combined with a management which 
has not been characterized by a market oriented approach,
8 3
 as 
well as the general shortage of foreign exchange have led to 
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operating problems in the early eighties. These operating 
problems can be seen in one way in Figure 27, which shows an 
alarming increase in unit costs from 1980 to 1982. 
There are other signs that things are not as they should be, 
Kft has been losing out on some business because of inability to 
provide adequate capacity, in addition to business it loses due 
to the tariff problems discussed above. For example, in 1982 the 
i . ; ' I i I. . .' . < • 
cost to shippers of shipping containerized freight by road was at 
least double the cost by rail, yet 80'/. of container traffic went 
by road, because KR was unable to provide sufficient capacity.
4
* 
,, . • • • 1 ' 1 
These problems in equipment deployment are shown in Table 1. 
Locomotive availability has been dropping at an alarming rate. 
Both the 1982 and 1983 KR annual reports blame this on 
unavailability of spares due to foreign exchange shortages. 
Whatever the reason for the problems with locomotives, it 
represents a gross mis-allocation of resources to hold 30-40'/. of 
the rolling stock of the KR i d l e .
1 3
 As Table 1 shows, when the 
number of engines available falls by 20-25'/., utilization of all 
other rolling stock falls, and unit cOsts increase accordingly. 
-3- IDS/WP 451 
TABLE 1 OPERATIONAL INDICATORS 
1978 1979 1960 1981 1982 1983 
1. Average availability <%) 
diesel line locomotives 62 66 68 72 69 56 
2. Average number of main line locomotives 
available for traffic 91.3 99.1 104.7 99.9 ' 81.9 
3. Average wagon availability ('/.) 81 82 81
:;
-'
!
' 85 87 
4. Average turnaround time (days) ' 
general freight wagons 10 12 13 14 15 
'tank wagons 12 12 13 16 
5. Productivity per available wagon-unit "'•'•'
 :joi
'' 
per year (tonne-lcm '000) 182 230 241 233 211 
Sources: World Bank, Kenya Transport Sector Memorandum, Annex 8 and KR 
annual reports, various years. 
- - - ~7 ~7~~T~r~., ~. ~ , 
Figure 29 shows financial performance. The data from 1965-
68 are for the combined operations of the railways and harbors. " 
Through the sixties returns were small but positive, and were 
adequate to cover interest payments.. Since the early' seventies 
returns have often been negative. The railways has always been a 
highly leveraged operation--equity has never
4
 exceeded 30y. of net 
11 u-< 
assets, and has on occasion been negative. To operate such a 
highly leveraged company on such a narrow margin invites 
liquidity problems, as reserves can be eroded very quickly. The 
risk inherent in this strategy is attenuated by the fact that the 
government holds a large part of the railways' debt and has 
converted it to equity as a form of bailout on several occasions. 
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III. Prices, Accumulation and Efficiency 
The use of public enterprise in the infrastructural sectors 
raises some basic questions about policy goals. Here ve face 
directly the contradiction between the idea that firms should 
maximize profits versus the goal of maximizing allocative 
efficiency by providing services at marginal or average cost. 
The seven corporations ve have examined here face a variety 
of market situations, and those differing market conditions seem 
to have dictated differing strategies on the part of government. 
In Table 2 we suggest two factors which are important in the 
choice of pricing policies for these firms. The first factor 
which differentiates these firms is shown vertically, and it is 
the question of whether the service in question is a natural 
monopoly. The second factor is whether demand is growing 
rapidly. Some of the firms have reached maturity, while others 
can expect rapid growth in the foreseeable future. 
From this dual classification scheme we arrive at a matrix 
with four cells. Yet all of the firms we are examining fall into 
three of the cells. This is not an accident. The cell which is 
empty is that for firms which are not natural monopolies, but for 
which r&pid growth is essential. In Kenya there are no such 
firms. In a market yhich is not a natural monopoly, even a 
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TABLE 2 CLASSIFICATION OF FIRMS BY MARKET CONDITIONS-
NEED FOR RAFID EXPANSION? 
YES NO 
rapidly growing market doesn't depend on rapid growth of. a parastatal 
firm. In Kenya such markets are open to competition from private 
firms. 
We can now examine the other three cells and find commonalities 
about their performance. The first cell contains those firms which 
have natural monopolies in sectors in vh^ch demand is growing fast... 
Granted that Kenya desires that such strategic firms should 
be in the public sector, a key goal of government is to ensure 
their access to capital, so that their expansion can keep pace 
with demand. We saw above that both of these firms have been 
allowed to charge prices which were high enough to generate funds 
which financed most of their expansion. A by-product of such 
generous pricing policies was sufficient liquidity that the firms 
, ;
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seem to have been able to function smoothly, with no major 
operational problems. 
There has been grumbling from time to time about the use of 
high prices to finance expansion. In 1984 the Public Law 
Institute formally objected to a proposed electricity tariff 
increase which had been justified in terms of generating revenue 
for reinvestment. The P.L.I, claimed that the proposed tariff 
was "punitive" and "undermined the government's economic and 
development policies of alleviating poverty, improving the 
welfare of Kenyans and providing rural electrification," as well 
a3 adding to inflation. The P.L.I, argued that "the incidence of 
the proposed increase is disproportionately laid on the present, 
in relation to future consumers."
3 6 
Another argument against the policy is that KPL still has 
, j . •.; •. 
some private shareholders, including some foreigners, so that a 
, 1 . . . V t 
I. I .. V 
policy which allows monopolistic prices and profits is 
questionable on distributional grounds.®
7
 While these arguments 
have some merit, the alternative of competitive pricing and 
borrowing or government saving has seldom seemed attractive. The 
policy has in fact worked well in practice for both firms. 
The second cell contains those firms which have a natural 
monopoly, but operate mature enterprises with no great need for 
expansion. The Kenya Pipeline Co. and Kenya Ports Authority fall 
, ;
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into this category. With these firmr it vould seem desirable to 
keep prices down near average total costs. Yet KPC operates in 
the petroleum sector which government has chosen to tax heavily. 
So the KPC has also been allowed monopolistically high prices, 
serving in effect as tax collector. This policy has minimized 
risk for the corporation and caused no notable distortions. The 
KPC was initially given a very small equity base, and the 
monopoly pricing policy has permitted it to gradually build 
equity. In other words, the monopolistic pricing policy has been 
used in lieu of a large initial investment on the part of 
government. 
The KPA is different from KPC in that it was already 
•. • . . . , . ' ' • • • • • • 
physically complete at the time it was organized, and it was 
given a sound financial base from the start. It seems that at 
the time of its creation the KPA was allowed monopolistic prices 
and profits, but this policy has gradually been abandoned. Given 
the volatility of traffic in the early eighties it may be a 
desirable policy to allow prices somewhat above costs in order to 
ensure adequate liquidity for KPA. In order to prevent KPA from 
accumulating excessive reserves, this pricing policy should be 
combined with a policy where KPA pays corporation tax and 
dividends, as does KPC. 
Finally we come to the last cell, which includes those 
parastatals which operate in a competitive environment. These 
-6 a-
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firms' prices are set in accordance with a vigorous private 
sector. These firms' performance, while it may be seen as 
important, is not critical to government, since the services they 
provide are available from others. It is here where all the 
major problems can be found, both financial and operational. 
These three firms, Kenya Airways, Kenatco and Kenya 
Railways, have presented a conundrum to policy makers. On the 
one hand, it is not essential that the government should own such 
firms, especially KA and Kenatco. In times of financial 
stringency there is no clear reason why they should have priority 
in allocation of scarce investment shillings, and so they 
haven't. On the other hand, these firms are in the public 
sector. Given that they are there, the stingy treatment they 
have received from their shareholders, the government, has landed 
every one of them in financial and operating problems. 
The government seems not to have understood the limitations 
imposed on it in its role of shareholder by the competitiveness 
of the markets in which these firms function. One of the 
defining features of a competitive industry is that prices are 
: i • • • •• •' '
 1 
driven down to long-run average costs, so there is no margin from 
which to finance socially mandated, non-commercially oriented 
activities. Yet, as we saw in the case of Kenatco and KR, 
government has not refrained from mandating such activities. 
Unless the government realizes that competitive firms have no 
, ;
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ability to finance such activities and either refrains from 
mandating them or provides the necessary finance, poor 
performance is likely to continue among parastatals in 
competitive markets. 
Government seems also not to have appreciated that cutting 
investment budgets to sub-optimal levels has different 
consequences than cutting qovernment consumption. With 
enterprise-type activities a shilling cut from the budget in 
terms of investment is not necessarily a shilling saved in the 
net public exchequer, since it may result in financial losses,to 
the enterprise. This is 9II the more true where the enterprise 
is in a competitive market. A fj,rm with improper capital 
equipment may be unable to attract customers, as we saw with KA. 
Undercapitalization can alro cause higher operating costs, vhiqh 
nuickly l^ads to fineiciaJ hemorrhaging and operating problems, 
as we saw with KR. , 
• . ' 1 
In each of the^e three cases it is clear that what is needed 
is for government to better fill its conventional role of 
shareholder. No heroic new controls on management are called 
for, rather the converse is true. In the case of Kenya Airways, 
the firm, needs new capital equipment and an equity base. The 
managers seem to h«ve been doing their.best under difficult 
circumstances. .. , • 
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The caae of Kenatco is least clear. Management problems 
seem to have persisted over several years and several management 
teams, raising again the question of why and whether it is really 
desirable for the government to own one firm in a competitive 
industry. Nonetheless, it is clear that Kenatco 3hould be 
treated more like a firm. It cannot suddenly be burdened with 
providing police escort services to the whole sector, yet remain 
competitive. 
Finally, Kenya Railways seems to have been neglected. It 
was left to compete on unequal footing with a vigorous private 
transport sector which doesn't share the burden of infrastructure 
.;r » .i • • ' " • • •• 
maintenance. The result of this unfair competition has been 
i • • • . . • • • ..''• ic • ' • 
large losses, poor maintenance and average costs substantially 
I -.X . 
higher than necessary. Recent efforts to impose user taxes on 
roads and control axle loadings are steps in the right direction. 
They should be pursued; poor performance by KR is far from 
inevitable. [w . , I . 1 • • ""*,' ' 
t i 
IV. Conclusion 
u -•. • k • ' . . 11> '•' 't ... 
By and large, the history of public enterprise in the 
infrastructural sector in Kenya has been a success. Seven firms 
have operated. Impressive growth in services has been achieved, 
while unit costs have by and large been contained. This has been 
especially true in those firms which operate monopolies. The 
- 6 5 -
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government has allowed them to charge prices which permit them to 
finance large parts of their growth from internally generated 
funds. This policy has contributed to financial stability and 
liquidity among those firms, and has contributed to lack of 
operational problems. The policy makes most sense in those areas 
in which there is large growth to be financed. Even in a firm 
like the Kenya Pipeline Co., which is essentially mature, the 
policy permitted successful use of what is normally a risky 
strategy, use of very high levels of borrowing. In cases where 
large growth doesn't need to be financed the generous pricing 
policy should be combined with use of corporation taxes and 
dividends in order to stop excess accumulation of funds at the 
enterprise level. 
Another group of enterprises has not fared quite so well. 
Those enterprises which compete with private firms do not have 
the option of setting their prices at such generous levels. They 
are much more vulnerable to changes in market conditions. They 
are also much more vulnerable to risky policies chosen by their 
share-holder, the government. These policies have included high 
leveraging, as well as requiring the firms to subsidize certain 
of their customers (i.e. through railroad tariffs) or even their 
rivals (through provision of police escorts). All of the firms 
operating in competitive markets have experience financial and 
operating problems. These problems have been exacerbated by 
policies of the central government, which seems not to fully 
: : i 
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appreciate the enterprise nature of these investments. 
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